Cultural Intelligence Living Working Globally Pdf

WeChat-e1509414385584.jpg' alt='Cultural Intelligence Living Working Globally Pdf' title='Cultural Intelligence Living Working Globally Pdf' />The State of Strategic Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency. The Intelligence Communitys Neglect of Strategic Intelligence. John G. Heidenrich. BibMe Free Bibliography Citation Maker MLA, APA, Chicago, Harvard. Live Musical Show Sinhala Mp3. Occasional Paper n 24 Food Insecurity and Violent Conflict Causes, Consequences, and Addressing the Challenges HenkJan Brinkman and Cullen S. Hendrix. Part 2 Our Immortality or Our Extinction. When Artificial Intelligence gets superintelligent, its either going to be a dream or a nightmare for us. Quotes. What information consumes is rather obvious it consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention, and a. Historiographical approach Time. Crucial in understanding cultural memory as a phenomenon is the distinction between memory and history. This distinction was put. They come to experience all America has to offer. They hope to pay their way by working a summer job as they experience a new culture and learn English. Untitled18.png' alt='Cultural Intelligence Living Working Globally Pdf' title='Cultural Intelligence Living Working Globally Pdf' />Cultural studies is a field of theoretically, politically, and empirically engaged cultural analysis that concentrates upon the political dynamics of contemporary. Commonly misunderstood, we neglect it at our peril. The architects of the National Security Act of 1. Intelligence Community. This year marks the 6. National Security Act of 1. So many of our most prominent government institutions were created by this act the National Security Council NSC, the Armed Forces as a joint establishment, the US Air Force, and, of course, the Central Intelligence Agency CIA. As a living document, the act has outlasted the Cold War, for which it was devised, and much more. By the 1. 98. 0s the acts architects had passed away. Their thoroughness was such, however, that amendments have not radically altered what they essentially put in place. One relatively recent change, the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1. National Security Strategy, a document produced by the president and reported annually to the Congress. The original architects, with World War II in recent memory, knew very well the importance of giving commanders enough authority, and they likewise knew the importance of strategy. By 1. 94. 7 George Kennan had wired his now famous Long Telegram. In March 1. 94. 7, President Harry Truman announced what we now call the Truman Doctrine, and so initiated Americas national grand strategy of Communist Containment. Today, decades later, a national strategy is not only advisable for the republic but legally required. One can almost hear the original architects asking themselves, Why didnt we think of that But as much as the security acts architects would have approved of a published national strategy, they would, I believe, be greatly surprised, perhaps even incensed, by todays neglect of strategic intelligence in the Intelligence Community. Strategic intelligence collection and analysis is a capability they took pains to preserve we are perilously close to losing it. The reasons are complicated, but they deserve our examination and discussion in this anniversary year. Top of pageDoes Anyone Know What Strategic Intelligence Is Readers can easily get a sense of the problem by conducting a small, admittedly unscientific, survey. Hand someone a report on a foreign related topic and describe it as strategic intelligence. Then ask the recipient to explain the term strategic intelligence and how the report qualifies. In my own surveys, a typical reply, after an awkward pause, has been that strategic intelligence is information about countries, or about strategic nuclear forces, or perhaps a long range forecast. Another common reply, commendable in its honesty, has been I dont know. Substantively, none of these answers is adequate and they are downright odd when compared to the straightforward answers many of us would give when asked to define tactical intelligence. These might include something like intelligence information for the tactical battlefield. Logically enough, the official definition the Pentagon uses is equally straightforward Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting tactical operations. This is the Pentagons official definition of strategic intelligence Intelligence that is required for the formulation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater levels. Or, in fewer words, strategic intelligence is that intelligence necessary to create and implement a strategy, typically a grand strategy, what officialdom calls a national strategy. A strategy is not really a plan but the logic driving a plan. A strategy furthers ones advance towards goals by suggesting ways to accommodate andor orchestrate a variety of variables sometimes too many for the strategist alone to anticipate and understand. When foreign areas are involved, in depth expertise is required, which is what strategic intelligence provides. Without the insights of deep expertise insights based on detailed knowledge of obstacles and opportunities and enemies and friends in a foreign area a strategy is not much more than an abstract theory, potentially even a flight of fancy. The better the strategic intelligence, the better the strategy, which is why the definition of strategic intelligence should not be so mysterious. Nevertheless, in official circles and beyond, too many people attribute meanings to strategic and strategic intelligence that no dictionary supports. Ignorance of the meaning of these words has bred ignorance of the strategic product, with, in my view, enormous consequences. During the past decade and a half, since the Cold War, the production and use of strategic intelligence by the United States government has plunged to egregiously low levels. This decline is badly out of sync with the broader needs of the republic, fails to meet the nations foreign policy requirements, ill serves the countrys many national security officials, and retards the developing prowess of its intelligence analysts. This neglect is not only perilous, it is tragic. American ingenuity has made great contributions to the ancient craft of intelligence, contributions worthy of national pride. The most famous is the American spy satellite, a Cold War invention. Less famous but just as ingenious is multi departmental strategic intelligence, invented during World War II by the Office of Strategic Services OSS. Yet, within the government that created it and that was once its master artisan, this analytical invention is now largely neglected. As my informal surveys suggest, very few employees of the Intelligence Community would say they are working to advance the implementation of the official National Security Strategy or indeed, any strategy. Instead, much of todays intelligence is tactical, tangential, or tied to national strategy only by formal references to high level strategic planning or guidance documents in forewords, prefaces, or other such administrative front matter. Jm Integrated Remote Station. Top of pageWhos Thinking About Tomorrow From my perspective, its not clear anyone is, or will be at least not as long as the analysts primary product is current intelligence, which in essence is only the daily news compiled with secret information. This type of intelligence must be desirable since so many consumers do consume it, but, like journalism without investigative reporting, it is not strategic intelligence and cannot replace it. As a percentage of the communitys workload, however, it nearly has. In a survey of hundreds of community analysts performed by a fellow at CIAs Center for the Study of Intelligence CSI about two years ago, these complaints were heard Our products have become so specific, so tactical even, that our thinking has become tactical. Were losing our strategic edge because were so focused on todays issues. About 1. 5 years ago, I used to have 6. Now, its between 2. Velocity isnt a substitute for quality. Weve gotten rid of the real analytic products that we use to make, and now we just report on current events. Many of the communitys elders likewise lament the consequences of a national intelligence effort now so focused upon the immediate The Intelligence Community really is focused on current intelligence, on policy support. It does very little research. It has very little understanding below the level of the policymaker and, in my view, on many issues. I think that, in some ways, these two groups are reinforcing each others worst habits.